Arxiv preprint
The liberalisation of the European passenger railway markets through the European Directive EU 91/440/EEC states a new scenario where different Railway Undertakings compete with each other in a bidding process for time slots. The infrastructure resources are provided by the Infrastructure Manager, who analyses and assesses the bids received, allocating the resources to each Railway Undertaking. Time slot allocation is a fact that drastically influences the market equilibrium. In this paper, we address the time slot allocation problem within the context of a liberalized passenger railway market as a multi-objective model. The Infrastructure Manager is tasked with selecting a point from the Pareto front as the solution to the time slot allocation problem. We propose two criteria for making this selection: the first one allocates time slots to each company according to a set of priorities, while the second one introduces a criterion of fairness in the treatment of companies to incentive competition. The assessment of the impact of these rules on market equilibrium has been conducted on a liberalized high-speed corridor within the Spanish railway network.